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VOTING TRUST AGREEMENTS IN INDIANA
LOUIE M. HORNE*
Along with the rapid development of the corporation as
a form of b.usiness enterprise, many problems pertaining to
the control and operation of the corporation havE arisen. The
stockholders of a corporation, often numbering in the thou-
sands, are usually small investors unfamiliar with the intri-
cate problems of management and for that reason have little
interest in exercising their rights as stockholders and owners
to vote. So long as the corporation continues to pay divi-
dends, the problems of management and policy are beyond
the pale of their interests. The reluctance of stockholders
in general to exercise their voting privilege i,3 a familiar
aspect of modern corporate management. For this and nu-
merous other reasons, it become necessary to centralize the
control of the corporation and as a means to effectuate this
end, the voting trust agreement was developed.
In a voting trust, the shares are conveyed to a trustee
and are transferred on the books of the corporation. The
trustee then issues to the former stockholder 'trust certifi-
cates which recite that each holder of such a certificate is
entitled to the delivery of his stock at the end of a specified
period or until a certain object has been reached and that
he may transfer the trustee's certificate as he would a share
of stock. Dividends are paid to the holders of the trustee's
certificates, less expenses. No proxy is given. The legal
owner of the shares, the trustee, has the voting power.'
Upon a resume of the cases involving voting trusts it
will usually be found that where a court has decided to up-
hold the voting trust agreement, it has cited as its authority
the decisions of those states supporting its view, and has
omitted to cite the opposite contentions. Likewise, courts
who have felt ill-disposed towards voting trust agreements
have cited as their authorities supporting cases and have
excluded opposite holdings. The real ground of the decisions,
* Indianapolii, Indiana.
1. See Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927 Ed.) 1582; 5 Fletcher
Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 2075; 44 Words & Phrases (Perm.
Ed.) pp. 466-467; 18 C.J.S., Corps. See. 552; Bankers' F. & M.
Ins. Co. v. Sloss, 229 Ala. 26, 155 So. 371 (1934); In re Morse,
247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374; Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9,
181 S.E. 897, 105 A.L.R. 102 (1935).
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however, is not the arguments paraded in the opinion, but
the more subtle and inarticulate views which have influ-
enuced jurists in all ages, i.e., the historical setting, the
judicial temper, the economic background and many other
elements that enter into the makeup of judicial decisions.
Voting trust agreements have been used for numerous
ends. A corporation may because of poor management find
itself in difficult financial condition although the business is
fundamentally sound. Creditors may be willing to lend ad-
ditional capital to the corporation if the stockholders assure
them control to protect their investment.2  Similarly, cor-
porations in sound financial condition but in need of more
capital may find it necessary to encourage new investments
by giving the control to an impartial group.3 In one case,
a voting trust agreement was used to wind up the affairs of
the corporation.4 In Clowes v. Miller, a voting trust was es-
tablished to facilitate a sale of stock. In 1919 a New Jersey
Court upheld a voting trust formed to prevent the stock of
a corporation manufacturing submarines for the use of Eng-
land during the war from falling into the hands of German
agents.6
There is some language in the decision of a New York
Court in the case of Tompers v. Bank of America which
2. Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Company, 144 Ky. 264, 138 S.W. 264
(1911). In this case the corporation found itself in difficult
financial circumstances and undertook to reorganize. The voting
trust agreement was upheld against the objections of a minority
stockholder. See also Warner Bros. Pictures v. Lawton-Byrne-
Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79 F. (2d) 804 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935).
3. Simmons v. Atlanta T. & T. Co., 139 Ga. 488, 77 S.E. 377 (1913).
4. Bowditch v. Jackson, 76 N.H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014 (1912).
5. 60 N.J.Eq. 179, 47 Atl. 345 (1900).
6. Frost v. Carse, 91 N.J.Eq. 124, 108 Atl. 642 (1919).
7. 217 App. Div. 691 (New York), 217 N.Y.S. 67. In this case the
court said: "As the object of these actions and the effect of the
injunction may be to open the way to a competing institution to
engulf the defendant bank and its management, or to permit several
speculators to embarrass the bank in the accomplishment of their
designs, the orders should have at least awaited trial." In the
case of Hall v. The Trust Co., 106 Me. 465 (1910) an agreement
was executed among the majority stockholders, which pooled the
stock in the hands of the trustee for the purpose of preventing
adverse interests from getting control of the corporation. The
power of sale was conferred upon the trustee, which was to be
exercised ly I-im in accordance with the directions of a commit-
tee. The .YIaine court said that the agreement was not a voting
trust, but a power to sell coupled with an incidental provision for
voting and thereby relieving themselves from considering the
legality of such a voting trust.
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indicates that a court might uphold a voting trust which is
designed to prevent a rival group from getting control of the
corporation. Voting trust agreements have been upheld when
their general purpose was to secure efficient manaagement of
the corporation, 8 or to retain for a fixed period of time the
management and control in the person who origirally promot-
ed the same.9 In general, it may be said that trust agree-
ments are valid.10
In the early stages of the development of voting trust
agreements there was a strong sentiment against them which
found expression in the opinions of the judges. It was held
in a very early case that the trustee, acting for more than
one stockholder, who attempted to cast a majority of the
votes at an election, could be restrained.", In the case of
Bostwick v. Chapman, 2 decided in 1890 and generally re-
8. Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 Atl. 103 (1910).
9. Gray v. Bloomington & Normal Railway, 120 Ill. App. 159 (1905).
10. Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., 25 F. (2d) 788, cert. denied,
278 U.S. 618, 73 L. Ed. 541, 49 Sup. Ct. 22 (1928); In re O'Gara
Coal Co., 260 Fed. 742 (1919); Borland v. Prindle Co. 144
Fed. 713 (1906); Ziezler v. Railway Co., 69 Fed. 176 (1895);
Moses v. Scott, 84 Ala. 608, 4 So. 742 (1888); Mobile & 0. R. Co.
v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893); Smith v. San Fran-
cisco & N.P. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582, 35 L.R.A1. 309 (1897);
Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., Del. Ch. -, 7
A. (2d) 753 (1939); Weber v. Della Mountain Min, Co., 35 Idaho
404, 94 Pac. 441 (1908); Kann v. Rossett, 307 Ill App. 204, 30
N.E. (2d) 204 (1940); Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation
Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648; Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 258
Ill. 523, 101 N.E. 949 (1913); Gray v. Bloomington & Normal By.
supra note 9; Ecker v. Kentucky Refining Co., supra note 2;
Hall v. Merrill Trust Co., supra note 7; Green v. Nash, 84 Me.
148, 26 Atl. 1114 (1892); Abbot v. Waltham Watch Co., 260 Mass.
81, 156 N.E. 897 (1927); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55
N.E. 809 (1900); General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91
N.J.Eq. 234, 100 AtI. 347 (1917); Chapman v. Bates, 61 N.J.Eq.
5, 47 AtI. 638 (1900); Kressl v. Distilling Co. of America,
61 N.J.Eq. 5, 47 Atl. 471 (1900); Tompers v. Banks of America,
supra note 7; Mason v. Curtis, 223 N.Y.S. 313, 119 N.E. 559
(1918); Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519, 43 N.E. 57
(1896) ; Redman v. Minnis, 43 Ohio App. 371, 183 N.E. 299 (1932) ;
Boyer v. Nesbitt, supra note 8; White v. Snell, 34 Utah 434, 100
Pac. 927 (1909); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance
Co., 111 Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1186 (1910); Thomp-
son-Starrett.Co. v. E. B. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 262, 84 Atl. 1017
(1912); Winson v. Commonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114
Pac. 908, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 63; Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241,
167 Pac. 908 (1917).
11. Mac v. DeBardeleben Coal & Iron Co., 90 Ala. 396, 8 So. 150 (1889).
12. 60 Conn. 553, 24 AtI. 32 (1890). The court in Ma, kin v. Nicollet
Hotel, supra note 10, as follows: "There has been a gradual modi-
fication of the views of both courts and text-writers upon this
subject in modern times. The old theory which to dominate the
earlier writers, to the effect that every stockholder in a corpora-
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ferred to as the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, a voting trust
agreement was held invalid because it involved a separation of
control from beneficial interests in the corporation. An Il-
linois court held that all stock must be given the right to
vote under statute and the constitution of the state.' 3 The
basis upon which many of the courts opposed to voting trust
agreements have based their decisions is expressed by the
court in Luthy v. Ream. 14  The court said: "The principle to
be deducted from these cases is that the holders of the ma-
jority of shares in a corporation may control its management,
and every person who becomes an owner of stock has the
right to believe that the corporation will, and to insist that
it shall, be managed by the majority; that the power to vote
is inherently attached to and inseparable from the real own-
ership of each share, and can only be delegated by proxy,
with power of revocation; that each stockholder must be free
to cast his vote, whether by himself or by proxy, for the best
interest of the corporation; that each stockholder has the
right to demand that every other stockholder if he desires
to do so, shall have the right to exercise at each annual meet-
ing his own judgment as to the best interests of all the stock-
holders, untrammeled by dictation and unfettered by the
obligation of any contract."
In Harvey v. Linville Improvement Company 15 the court
held a voting trust agreement invalid by saying that the
power to vote is inherently annexed and inseperable from
the real ownership of each share, and can only be delegated
by proxy with power of revocation. In Hafer v. N.Y.L.E. &
W.R.R. Co.,36 the court held a voting trust agreement to be
invalid at the suit of a minority stockholder and stated: "The
law presumes that the pecuniary interests of a stockholder
will be a motive to impel him to vote in such a manner as
will promote the interests of the company. Such a motive
tion is entitled to have the benefit of judgment of every other
stockholder in the election of a board of directors, has necessarily
been rendered obsolete because of our modern business being con-
ducted by large corporations with thousands of stockholders locat-
ed in all parts of the country."
13. People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922).
14. 270 111. 170, 110 N.E. 373 (1915). See also Kreissl v. The Dis-
tillin,- Co of America, supra note 10; White v. Thomas Inflatable
Tire o., 52 N.J.Eq. 178, 28 Atl. 75 (1893).
15. 118 N.C 693, 24 S.E. 489 (1896).
16. 14 W. .. 68 (Ohio) (1885).
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is entirely lacking if one who is not a stockholder-and if
such a person be empowered to vote for directors, he may
be subject to interests and motives other than such as would
conduce to the welfare of the company."
Whether or not a statute exists authorizing voting trust
agreements, such agreements have been held invalid if the
object of the voting trust is the accomplishment of some
unlawful end, or where its object is not in the interests of all
the stockholders, but to give some unfair advantage to a
party or parties to the agreement. 17
In a great many cases involving the validity of voting
trust agreements the general question has been broadened
beyond the question whether a voting trust ma..T under any
circumstances be valid to embrace the particular question
whether a given one was valid and legally sufficient. The
condemnatory language found in the earlier casEs, beginning
with the Shepaug Voting Trust Cases from which can be
spelled a wholesale condemnation of voting trust agreements
without regard to their purpose, 8 seems to have run its course
and the tide of condemnation moves toward a di:3criminating
approval." Early pronouncements against the validity of vot-
ing trust agreements were based upon the theory that such
trusts are against public policy. Public policy varies from
time to time20 and generalized statements of it have been pro-
nounced dangerous because uncertain and vague, especially
as applied to voting pools and combinations.21
To examine in detail the arguments against the validity
17. Bankers' Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss, supra note 1.
18. The most extreme hostility is to be found in bTorth Carolina
cases which come just short of being out and out declarations of
a wholesale policy against voting trust agreements. See Harvey
v. Linville Impv. Co., supra note 15; Bridges v. First National
Bank of Tarboro, 152 N.C. 293, 67 S.E. 770, 31 L.R.A., (N.S.) 1199(1910); Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., 150 N.C. 776, 64
S.E. 894 (1909).
19. Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co. of America,
supra note 10. In this well known case the ccurt said: "In
the early stages of the development of this idea, 1'voting trusts]
there was a strong sentiment against them which found expression
in the opinions of judges and in the not always temperate lan-
guage of commentators upon the law; but experience has dm-
onstrated their usefulness, and the hostility evinced towards them
has by degrees diminished." See also note 12.
20. McGinniss v. Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co.,
29 Mont. 428, 75 Pac. 89; McKendree v. Southern States Life Ins.
Co., 112 S.C. 335, 99 S.E. 806.
21. Smith v. San Francisco & N.P. Ry., supra note 10.
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of the voting trust agreement is unnecessary inasmuch as
nearly every case, where a voting trust was held to be against
public policy, the court was opposed, not to the voting trust
agreement per se,22 but to the objects of the contracting
parties. Even those decisions in which the particular agree-
ments under consideration at the time have been held to be
invalid have usually recognized that there may be such a
thing as a valid voting trust.23  Usually, the agreements were
permeated with fraud and often the objects of the subscribers
to the trust agreement were not such as could be counten-
anced in a court of equity.
Although in many instances courts embarked on elab-
orate dissertations on the invalidity of voting trusts, it would
have been sufficient to show that the fraud in the agreements
rendered them unenforceable. In the course of time judicial
thought and utterances have clarified, and the majority of
courts now agree that valid voting trust agreements are pos-
sible. Many states have enacted legislation recognizing the
validity of voting trusts beginning with New York in 1901,21
and followed by Maryland in 1908.25 Since that time the
states of Florida,26 Nevada,27 Delaware,28 New Jersey,29 Ar-
kansas,2 0 Ohio,3 ' Louisiana, 2 California,3 3 Michigan,34 Min-
22. In Bostwick v. Chapman, supra note 12, the court had this to say:
"It is insisted that there is nothing illegal per se, in the pool-
ing of stock to carry out a scheme of extension authorized by
law and favored by the corporation. This may be true under
proper limitations. . .. "
23. In Cone v. Russell, 44 N.J.Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847, Chancellor Pit-
ney stated: "This conclusion does not reach so far as to neces-
sarily forbid all pooling or combining of stock, where the object
is to carry out a particular policy with the view to promote the
best interests of all the stockholders."
24. McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, v. 58, Stock Corp.
Law, Sec. 50.
25. Flack's Annotated Code of Maryland, Corps., Sec. 131.
26. Compiled Gen. Laws of Florida, Fourth Div., Title III, c. IV.
Art. 5, Sec. 6545.
27. Nevada Compiled Laws (1929), Corps., Sec. 1621.
28. Revised Code of Delaware (1935) c. 65, Sec. 2050.
29. New Jersey Statutes Ann., Corps., Title 14, c. 10, Sec. 14: 10-10.
30. Pope's Digest of Statutes of Arkansas, c. 37, See. 2175.
31. Page's Ohio General Code, Corps. Act (1927), Sec. 8623-34.
32. Dart's Louisiana Gen. Statutes, Title 14, c. 1, Sec. 1113.
33. Civ. Code of California, Sec. 321(a).
34. Michigan 8tatutes Ann., c. 195, Gen. Corp. Act, Sec. 21.34.
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nesota, 5 Kansas, 36 Nebraska37 and New Hampshire-8 have
passed statutes authorizing voting trusts.39
In absence of an express statute, the validity of a voting
trust depends on the purpose and nature of the agreement
involved. Although there have been a few opinions rendered
which indicate that there can be no valid votirtg trust with-
out the aid of a statute, it may be said that generally a voting
trust may be valid in absence of an express statute author-
izing its creation.40 In some cases statutes relating to proxies
or the right to vote at stockholders meetings have been re-
garded as indicative of legislative policy approving or dis-
approving of voting trust agreements. 4 1  Of course, a voting
trust agreement must comply with the prerequisites of trust
and contract law to be valid where not authorized by statute.42
Taking the cases as a whole, it may be concluded that
there is no general indiscriminating public policy against
voting trust agreements if they are formed for a lawful pur-
35. Mason's Minnesota Statutes (1940 Supp.), c. 58, Sec. 7492-26.
36. General Statutes of Kansas Ann., (1941 Supp.), c. 17, Art. 33,
See. 3307.
37. Compiled Statutes of Nebraska (1941 Supp.), c. 24, Art. 1, Sec.
24-135.
38. Laws of New Hampshire (1931), c. 104, p. 116, amending Sec. 1,
c. 226.
39. The statute of California is quoted for the purpose of showing
the manner in which voting trusts are validatei. Sec. 321(a)
provides as follows: "Shares of stock in any corporation may be
transferred to a trustee or trustees in order to confer upon
them the right to vote and otherwise represent such shares.
"A duplicate of the voting trust agreement may be filed in the
office of the corporation, and if so filed shall be open to in-
spection by any shareholder, or holder of a voting trust cer-
tificate, or his agent upon--tie same terms as the stock books of
the corporation are open to inspection.
"If the voting trust agreement be so filed, the corporation
shall take notice of its terms and the limitations on the authority
of the trustees thereunder.
"Anytrust, the sole or principal purpose cf which is the
voting or representing of shares, may be terminated at any time
by the holders of a majority in interest of the beneficial inter-
ests therein unless otherwise specified therein. No such voting
trust shall be made irrevocable for a period of more than twenty-
one years."
40. Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, supra note 10; Verner v. Chicago
City R.R., note 10 supra; Day v. Helca Mining Co., 126 Wash.
50, 217 Pac. 1 (1923).
41. See Smith v. San Francisco & N. R.R., supra note 10; Boyer v.
Nesbitt, supra note 8; Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 Pac. 908(1907).
42. For a complete annotation of the validity of voting trusts accord-
ing to states see 105 A.L.R. 123.
1944]
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pose and are capable of being executed in a lawful manner.
Courts cannot forbid voting trusts, and have not attempted
to do so, but have merely declared that the particular trust
offended some legislative prohibition. A fair and close anal-
ysis of the cases will show that their expressions of an ad-
verse policy may be reduced to particular grounds of invalidity
in the voting trust agreement which was under judgment, or
to wrongs done under it. The objects, purposes, and effects
of the trust determines its validity, and if that is lawful
it is valid, provided, it can be accomplished in a lawful man-
ner. The motives and intentions of the parties to the trust
will not establish the validity of a voting trust, but the con-
trolling question is what the agreement permits.
No case has been decided by an Indiana Court involving
the validity of a voting trust agreement. In Groub v. Blish. 3
the minority stockholders entered into an agreement to as-
sign their stock to three persons as depositaries (the major-
*ty stockholders) for twenty years and also gave the deposi-
taries an irrevocable proxy to vote the stock for the time
stipulated. The depositaries agreed to issue participating
certificates, to collect dividends, and to accumulate a: sinking
fund therefrom to retire one class of certificate at the end
of the twenty years. The court, in holding the agreement
valid, said that the effect of the contract was a sale and not
a voting trust. Although the court declared the contract did
not create a voting trust, an inference might be drawn from
the opinion that voting trusts are not illegal per se.4 '
In the case of Rice v. Fletcher Savings and Trust Com-
pany,'4 5 the plaintiffs attempted to assert ownership of the
testator's stock in a life insurance company which by agree-
ment had been assigned for voting purposes to the defendant.
In connection with the agreement, the court held that an
agreement whereby stockholders place their stock in trust
for voting purposes only was not void as undertaking to per-
43. 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N.E. 609 (1926).
44. The court stated as follows: "The execution of the agreements
by which the- depositaries were given irrevocable authority to
vote appellant's stock did not give them any power over the
corporation that they did not already possess, and did not create
a voting trust that was invalid under the facts and circumstances
of this case."
45. 215 Ind. 698, 22 N.E. (2d) 809 (1939).
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petuate certain persons in office as directors of the corpora-
tion.46
Many elements, other than law and precedent, may enter
into the make-up of a judicial decision, and it is not only
difficult but impossible to anticipate or predetermine a court's
reaction to an untried issue. If, however, a case arose in-
volving the validity of a voting trust agreement and was
presented to an Indiana Court, in my opinion, it would be
declared valid assuming that the legal requisites of contract
and trust law were satisfied, that no fraud was present, and
that the purpose to be accomplished was lawful.
Since no case has been decided squarely on the issue by
the courts of Indiana, public policy could be a "peg" upon
which the court, in deciding adversely to the validity of the
agreement, could base its decision. Without a doubt, the
opposing parties would strongly argue this question. The
court would be faced with the question of deciding or deter-
mining what the policy was or is to be. Whatever position
the court took, its decision could be substantiated and sup-
ported by ample authority. However, it is believed that the
trend of the later decisions and the increased number of
statutes passed authorizing the use of the voting trust agree-
ment lends to a strong presumption that the court would de-
clare that there was no public policy against them.
The fact that no statute exists in Indiana authorizing
voting trust agreements does not weaken the argument that
they are valid as evidenced by the numerous decisions of state
and federal courts where no statute was present. However,
a statute may strengthen the argument for the validity of
such an agreement in that it may validate what would other-
wise by an invalid trust or contract, and further, a statute
is a concrete expression of public policy.
At this point, I think it would be safe to assume that a
voting trust agreement is not invalid per se.
The voting trust agreement must satisfy the legal requi-
sites of contract and trust law, i.e., writing, consideration,
dry trusts, fraud, etc. For the purpose of this discussion, I
46. The validity of the agreement by which the testator and others
assigned to the Trust Company, as trustee, their stock to vote
for certain persons therein named as directors of the life in-
surance company, and reserved to themselves the right to vote
the stock on all other questions was not attacked as being in-
valid as a voting trust agreement.
19441
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again make an assumption, viz., that the agreement before the
court would be sufficient in every way to satisfy these legal
requisites.
As has been said by many commentators on the law, the
validity of a. voting trust agreement, in absence of express
statute, depends on the purpose and nature of the agreement
involved. The courts carefully scrutinize the purpose for
which the agreement was executed, and whether it be to
encourage financial assistance, secure efficient management,
minority control, or other reasons the purpose must be lawful.
If the agreement in effect is fraudulent, or gives some unfair
advantage to a small group, or is contrary to the best inter-
ests of the minority stockholders or the corporation, the court
would be justified in holding the particular agreement invalid
without establishing a precedent unfavorable to all voting
trust agreements. In fact, many courts in holding a particular
agreement illegal, have emphatically stated that the voting
trust agreements are not illegal per se.
It would appear that the voting trust agreement has not
been extensively used in this state, if at all, because there is
neither statute nor legal precedent evidencing a favorable at-
titude towards them. Since there are many advantages to
be gained from the proper use of such agreements, favorable
legislation would be helpful in clearing the "atmosphere of
doubt" that now exists as to the validity of the voting trust
agreement.
[Vol. 19
